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[[Image:Carcharhinus galapagensis hooked.jpg|thumb|right|A [[Galapagos shark]] hooked by a fishing boat]]
[[Image:Carcharhinus galapagensis hooked.jpg|thumb|right|A [[Galapagos shark]] hooked by a fishing boat]]
The idea that '''[[animals]]''' might not experience '''[[pain]]''' and '''[[suffering]]''' as [[human being]]s do traces back at least to the 17th-century French philosopher, [[René Descartes]], who argued that animals lack [[consciousness]].<ref name=Carbone149>Carbone, Larry. '"What Animal Want: Expertise and Advocacy in Laboratory Animal Welfare Policy''. Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 149.</ref><ref name=nuffield45>[http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/RIA_Report_FINAL-opt.pdf The Ethics of research involving animals] Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Accessed 27 February 2008 {{Wayback|url=http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/RIA_Report_FINAL-opt.pdf|date =20080227041442|bot=DASHBot}}</ref><ref>Talking Point on the use of animals in scientific research, EMBO reports 8, 6, 2007, pp. 521–525</ref> [[Bernard Rollin]] of Colorado State University, the principal author of two U.S. federal laws regulating pain relief for animals, writes that researchers remained unsure into the 1980s as to whether animals experience pain, and veterinarians trained in the U.S. before 1989 were simply taught to ignore animal pain.<ref name=Rollin117>Rollin, Bernard. ''The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science''. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. xii, 117-118, cited in Carbone 2004, p. 150.</ref> In his interactions with scientists and other veterinarians, Bernard Rollin was regularly asked to "prove" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" grounds for claiming that they feel pain.<ref name=Rollin117/> Some authors say that the view that animals feel pain differently is now a minority view.<ref name=Carbone149/> Academic reviews of the topic are more equivocal, noting that although the argument that animals have at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings has strong support,<ref>Griffin DR, Speck GB (2004) "New evidence of animal consciousness" ''Anim. Cogn.'' volume 7 issue 1 pages=5–18 PMID 14658059</ref> some critics continue to question how reliably animal mental states can be determined.<ref name=nuffield45/><ref>Allen C (1998) [http://jas.fass.org/cgi/reprint/76/1/42.pdf Assessing animal cognition: ethological and philosophical perspectives] ''J. Anim. Sci.'' volume 76 issue 1 pages 42-7 PMID 9464883</ref>
The idea that '''[[animals]]''' might not experience '''[[pain]]''' and '''[[suffering]]''' as [[human being]]s do traces back at least to the 17th-century French philosopher, [[René Descartes]], who argued that animals lack [[consciousness]].<ref name=Carbone149>Carbone, Larry. '"What Animal Want: Expertise and Advocacy in Laboratory Animal Welfare Policy''. Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 149.</ref><ref name=nuffield45>[http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/RIA_Report_FINAL-opt.pdf The Ethics of research involving animals] Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Accessed 27 February 2008 {{Wayback|url=http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/RIA_Report_FINAL-opt.pdf|date =20080227041442|bot=DASHBot}}</ref><ref>Talking Point on the use of animals in scientific research, EMBO reports 8, 6, 2007, pp. 521–525</ref> [[Bernard Rollin]] of Colorado State University, the principal author of two U.S. federal laws regulating pain relief for animals, writes that researchers remained unsure into the 1980s as to whether animals experience pain, and veterinarians trained in the U.S. before 1989 were simply taught to ignore animal pain.<ref name=Rollin117>Rollin, Bernard. ''The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science''. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. xii, 117-118, cited in Carbone 2004, p. 150.</ref> In his interactions with scientists and other veterinarians, Bernard Rollin was regularly asked to "prove" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" grounds for claiming that they feel pain.<ref name=Rollin117/> Some authors say that the view that animals feel pain differently is now a minority view.<ref name=Carbone149/> Academic reviews of the topic are more equivocal, noting that although the argument that animals have at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings has strong support,<ref>{{cite journal | pmid = 14658059 }}</ref> some critics continue to question how reliably animal mental states can be determined.<ref name=nuffield45/><ref>{{cite journal | author = Allen C | year = 1998 | title = Assessing animal cognition: ethological and philosophical perspectives | url = http://jas.fass.org/cgi/reprint/76/1/42.pdf | format = PDF | journal = J. Anim. Sci. | volume = 76 | issue = 1| pages = 42–7 | pmid = 9464883 }}</ref>


==Pain in different species==
==Pain in different species==
The presence of pain in an animal, or another human for that matter, cannot be known for sure, but it can be inferred through physical and behavioral reactions.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Abbott FV, Franklin KB, Westbrook RF |title=The formalin test: scoring properties of the first and second phases of the pain response in rats |journal=Pain |volume=60 |issue=1 |pages=91–102 |year=1995 |month=January |pmid=7715946 |doi= 10.1016/0304-3959(94)00095-V|url=http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0304-3959(94)00095-V}}</ref> Specialists currently believe that all vertebrates can feel pain, and that certain invertebrates, like the octopus, might too.<ref>[http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/lega-e/witn-e/shelly-e.htm "Do Invertebrates Feel Pain?"], The Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, The [[Parliament of Canada]] Web Site, accessed 11 June 2008.</ref><ref>{{cite journal |author=Jane A. Smith |title=A Question of Pain in Invertebrates |journal=ILAR Journal |volume=33 |issue=1-2 |pages= |year=1991 |month= |pmid= |doi= |url=http://dels.nas.edu/ilar_n/ilarjournal/33_1_2/V33_1_2Question.shtml |format={{dead link|date=May 2010}}}}</ref>
The presence of pain in an animal, or another human for that matter, cannot be known for sure, but it can be inferred through physical and behavioral reactions.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Abbott FV, Franklin KB, Westbrook RF |title=The formalin test: scoring properties of the first and second phases of the pain response in rats |journal=Pain |volume=60 |issue=1 |pages=91–102 |year=1995 |month=January |pmid=7715946 |doi= 10.1016/0304-3959(94)00095-V|url=http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0304-3959(94)00095-V}}</ref> Specialists currently believe that all vertebrates can feel pain, and that certain invertebrates, like the octopus, might too.<ref>[http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/lega-e/witn-e/shelly-e.htm "Do Invertebrates Feel Pain?"], The Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, The [[Parliament of Canada]] Web Site, accessed 11 June 2008.</ref><ref>{{cite journal |author=Jane A. Smith |title=A Question of Pain in Invertebrates |journal=ILAR Journal |volume=33 |issue=1-2 |pages= |year=1991 |month= |pmid= |doi= |url=http://dels.nas.edu/ilar_n/ilarjournal/33_1_2/V33_1_2Question.shtml }} {{dead link|date=May 2010}}</ref>


Animal protection advocates have raised concerns about the suffering of fish caused by angling. In light of recent research, some countries, like Germany, have banned specific types of fishing, and the [[RSPCA]] (which has authority in England and Wales) now formally prosecutes individuals who are cruel to fish.<ref name="timesonline.co.uk">[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,176-1037515,00.html Leake, J. “Anglers to Face RSPCA Check,” The Sunday Times – Britain, 14 March 2004]</ref>
Animal protection advocates have raised concerns about the suffering of fish caused by angling. In light of recent research, some countries, like Germany, have banned specific types of fishing, and the [[RSPCA]] (which has authority in England and Wales) now formally prosecutes individuals who are cruel to fish.<ref name="timesonline.co.uk">[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,176-1037515,00.html Leake, J. “Anglers to Face RSPCA Check,” The Sunday Times – Britain, 14 March 2004]</ref>


As for other animals, plants, or other entities, their ability to feel physical pain is at present a question beyond scientific reach, since no mechanism is known by which they could have such a feeling. In particular, there are no apparent [[nociceptor]]s in groups such as plants, fungi, and most insects<ref>DeGrazia D, Rowan A (1991) [http://www.springerlink.com/content/p4g44725t17126x0/ Pain, suffering, and anxiety in animals and humans] ''Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics'' Volume 12, Number 3, pages 193-211</ref><ref>Lockwood JA (1987) [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0015-4040%28198703%2970%3A1%3C70%3ATMSOIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O The Moral Standing of Insects and the Ethics of Extinction] ''The Florida Entomologist'', Volume 70, Number 1, pages 70-89</ref><ref>C. H. Eisemann, W. K. Jorgensen, D. J. Merritt, M. J. Rice, B. W. Cribb, P. D. Webb and M. P. Zalucki (1984) Do insects feel pain? — A biological view. Cellular and Molecular Life Sciences 40: 1420-1423</ref> (one known exception being the [[Drosophila melanogaster|fruit fly]]).<ref>Tracey, J., W. Daniel, R. I. Wilson, G. Laurent, and S. Benzer. 2003. ''painless'', a ''Drosophila'' gene essential for nociception. Cell 113: 261-273. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0092-8674(03)00272-1</ref>
As for other animals, plants, or other entities, their ability to feel physical pain is at present a question beyond scientific reach, since no mechanism is known by which they could have such a feeling. In particular, there are no apparent [[nociceptor]]s in groups such as plants, fungi, and most insects<ref>{{cite journal | author = DeGrazia D, Rowan A | year = 1991 | title = Pain, suffering, and anxiety in animals and humans | url = http://www.springerlink.com/content/p4g44725t17126x0/ | journal = Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics | volume = 12 | issue = 3| pages = 193–211 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | author = Lockwood JA | year = 1987 | title = The Moral Standing of Insects and the Ethics of Extinction | url = http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0015-4040%28198703%2970%3A1%3C70%3ATMSOIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O | journal = The Florida Entomologist | volume = 70 | issue = 1| pages = 70–89 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | author = Eisemann C. H., Jorgensen W. K., Merritt D. J., Rice M. J., Cribb B. W., Webb P. D., Zalucki M. P. | year = 1984 | title = Do insects feel pain? — A biological view | url = | journal = Cellular and Molecular Life Sciences | volume = 40 | issue = | pages = 1420–1423 }}</ref> (one known exception being the [[Drosophila melanogaster|fruit fly]]).<ref>Tracey, J., W. Daniel, R. I. Wilson, G. Laurent, and S. Benzer. 2003. ''painless'', a ''Drosophila'' gene essential for nociception. Cell 113: 261-273. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0092-8674(03)00272-1</ref>


In [[vertebrates]], endogenous [[opioid]]s are neurochemicals that moderate pain by interacting with opiate receptors. Opioid peptides and opiate receptors occur naturally in crustaceans, and although “at present no certain conclusion can be drawn,”<ref name="Sømme" /> some have interpreted their presence as an indication that lobsters may be able to experience pain.<ref name="Sømme">{{cite journal |author=L. Sømme |year=2005 |title=Sentience and pain in invertebrates: Report to Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety |journal=[[Norwegian University of Life Sciences]], [[Oslo]] | quote=no}}</ref><ref name="afa">{{cite book|name=Advocates for Animals|title=Cephalopods and decapod crustaceans: their capacity to experience pain and suffering |publisher=Advocates for Animals |year=2005 |url=http://www.advocatesforanimals.org.uk/pdf/crustreport.pdf}}</ref>
In [[vertebrates]], endogenous [[opioid]]s are neurochemicals that moderate pain by interacting with opiate receptors. Opioid peptides and opiate receptors occur naturally in crustaceans, and although “at present no certain conclusion can be drawn,”<ref name="Sømme" /> some have interpreted their presence as an indication that lobsters may be able to experience pain.<ref name="Sømme">{{cite journal |author=L. Sømme |year=2005 |title=Sentience and pain in invertebrates: Report to Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety |journal=[[Norwegian University of Life Sciences]], [[Oslo]] | quote=no}}</ref><ref name="afa">{{cite book|name=Advocates for Animals|title=Cephalopods and decapod crustaceans: their capacity to experience pain and suffering |publisher=Advocates for Animals |year=2005 |url=http://www.advocatesforanimals.org.uk/pdf/crustreport.pdf}}</ref>
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{{Main|Pain in fish}}
{{Main|Pain in fish}}


Animal protection advocates have raised concerns about the possible suffering of fish caused by angling. In light of recent research, some countries, like Germany, have banned specific types of fishing, and the British [[RSPCA]] now formally prosecutes individuals who are cruel to fish.<ref name="timesonline.co.uk"/>
Animal protection advocates have raised concerns about the possible suffering of fish caused by angling. In light of recent research, some countries, like Germany, have banned specific types of fishing, and the British [[RSPCA]] now formally prosecutes individuals who are cruel to fish.<ref name="timesonline.co.uk"/>


===Crustaceans===
===Crustaceans===
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===Dolorimetry===
===Dolorimetry===
[[Dolorimeter|Dolorimetry]] (''dolor'': Latin: pain, grief) is the measurement of the pain response in animals, including humans. It is practiced occasionally in medicine, as a diagnostic tool, and is regularly used in research into the basic science of pain, and in testing the efficacy of analgesics. Non-human animal pain measurement techniques include the [[Randall-Selitto test| paw pressure test]], [[tail flick test]] and [[hot plate test]].
[[Dolorimeter|Dolorimetry]] (''dolor'': Latin: pain, grief) is the measurement of the pain response in animals, including humans. It is practiced occasionally in medicine, as a diagnostic tool, and is regularly used in research into the basic science of pain, and in testing the efficacy of analgesics. Non-human animal pain measurement techniques include the [[Randall-Selitto test|paw pressure test]], [[tail flick test]] and [[hot plate test]].


==See also==
==See also==
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{{animal cognition}}
{{animal cognition}}

[[Category:Pain]]
[[Category:Pain]]
[[Category:Animals]]
[[Category:Animals]]

Version vom 26. März 2011, 21:15 Uhr

A Galapagos shark hooked by a fishing boat

The idea that animals might not experience pain and suffering as human beings do traces back at least to the 17th-century French philosopher, René Descartes, who argued that animals lack consciousness.[1][2][3] Bernard Rollin of Colorado State University, the principal author of two U.S. federal laws regulating pain relief for animals, writes that researchers remained unsure into the 1980s as to whether animals experience pain, and veterinarians trained in the U.S. before 1989 were simply taught to ignore animal pain.[4] In his interactions with scientists and other veterinarians, Bernard Rollin was regularly asked to "prove" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" grounds for claiming that they feel pain.[4] Some authors say that the view that animals feel pain differently is now a minority view.[1] Academic reviews of the topic are more equivocal, noting that although the argument that animals have at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings has strong support,[5] some critics continue to question how reliably animal mental states can be determined.[2][6]

Pain in different species

The presence of pain in an animal, or another human for that matter, cannot be known for sure, but it can be inferred through physical and behavioral reactions.[7] Specialists currently believe that all vertebrates can feel pain, and that certain invertebrates, like the octopus, might too.[8][9]

Animal protection advocates have raised concerns about the suffering of fish caused by angling. In light of recent research, some countries, like Germany, have banned specific types of fishing, and the RSPCA (which has authority in England and Wales) now formally prosecutes individuals who are cruel to fish.[10]

As for other animals, plants, or other entities, their ability to feel physical pain is at present a question beyond scientific reach, since no mechanism is known by which they could have such a feeling. In particular, there are no apparent nociceptors in groups such as plants, fungi, and most insects[11][12][13] (one known exception being the fruit fly).[14]

In vertebrates, endogenous opioids are neurochemicals that moderate pain by interacting with opiate receptors. Opioid peptides and opiate receptors occur naturally in crustaceans, and although “at present no certain conclusion can be drawn,”[15] some have interpreted their presence as an indication that lobsters may be able to experience pain.[15][16]

Veterinary medicine uses, for actual or potential animal pain, the same analgesics and anesthetics as used in humans.[17]

Fish

Animal protection advocates have raised concerns about the possible suffering of fish caused by angling. In light of recent research, some countries, like Germany, have banned specific types of fishing, and the British RSPCA now formally prosecutes individuals who are cruel to fish.[10]

Crustaceans

The question of whether or not crustaceans can experience pain is unresolved. One paper holds that lobsters' opioids may "mediate pain in the same way" as in vertebrates.[16]

Laboratory animals

Vorlage:See also The extent to which animal testing causes pain and suffering in laboratory animals is the subject of much debate.[18] Marian Stamp Dawkins defines "suffering" in laboratory animals as the experience of one of "a wide range of extremely unpleasant subjective (mental) states."[19] The United States Department of Agriculture defines a "painful procedure" in an animal study as one that would "reasonably be expected to cause more than slight or momentary pain or distress in a human being to which that procedure was applied."[20] Some critics argue that, paradoxically, researchers raised in the era of increased awareness of animal welfare may be inclined to deny that animals are in pain simply because they do not want to see themselves as people who inflict it.[21] Animal research with the potential to cause pain is regulated by the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 in the UK, and by the Animal Welfare Act of 1966 in the US.

In the UK, research projects are classified as "mild", "moderate", and "substantial" in terms of the suffering the researchers conducting the study say they may cause; a fourth category of "unclassified" means the animal was anesthetized and killed without recovering consciousness. In December 2001, 39 percent (1,296) of project licenses in force were classified as "mild", 55 percent (1,811) as "moderate", two percent (63) as "substantial", and 4 percent (139) as "unclassified".[22]

In the US, the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals defines the parameters for animal testing regulations. It states "The ability to experience and respond to pain is widespread in the animal kingdom...Pain is a stressor and, if not relieved, can lead to unacceptable levels of stress and distress in animals."[23] The Guide states that the ability to recognize the symptoms of pain in different species is essential for the people caring for and using animals. Accordingly, all issues of animal pain and distress, and their potential treatment with analgesia and anesthesia, are required regulatory issues for animal protocol approval.

Dolorimetry

Dolorimetry (dolor: Latin: pain, grief) is the measurement of the pain response in animals, including humans. It is practiced occasionally in medicine, as a diagnostic tool, and is regularly used in research into the basic science of pain, and in testing the efficacy of analgesics. Non-human animal pain measurement techniques include the paw pressure test, tail flick test and hot plate test.

See also

References

Vorlage:Reflist

Vorlage:Animal cognition

  1. a b Carbone, Larry. '"What Animal Want: Expertise and Advocacy in Laboratory Animal Welfare Policy. Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 149.
  2. a b The Ethics of research involving animals Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Accessed 27 February 2008 Vorlage:Wayback
  3. Talking Point on the use of animals in scientific research, EMBO reports 8, 6, 2007, pp. 521–525
  4. a b Rollin, Bernard. The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. xii, 117-118, cited in Carbone 2004, p. 150.
  5. ? PMID 14658059.
  6. Allen C: Assessing animal cognition: ethological and philosophical perspectives. In: J. Anim. Sci. 76. Jahrgang, Nr. 1, 1998, S. 42–7, PMID 9464883 (fass.org [PDF]).
  7. Abbott FV, Franklin KB, Westbrook RF: The formalin test: scoring properties of the first and second phases of the pain response in rats. In: Pain. 60. Jahrgang, Nr. 1, Januar 1995, S. 91–102, doi:10.1016/0304-3959(94)00095-V, PMID 7715946 (elsevier.com).
  8. "Do Invertebrates Feel Pain?", The Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, The Parliament of Canada Web Site, accessed 11 June 2008.
  9. Jane A. Smith: A Question of Pain in Invertebrates. In: ILAR Journal. 33. Jahrgang, Nr. 1-2, 1991 (nas.edu). Vorlage:Toter Link/!...nourl (Seite nicht mehr abrufbar, festgestellt im Mai 2010.)
  10. a b Leake, J. “Anglers to Face RSPCA Check,” The Sunday Times – Britain, 14 March 2004
  11. DeGrazia D, Rowan A: Pain, suffering, and anxiety in animals and humans. In: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. 12. Jahrgang, Nr. 3, 1991, S. 193–211 (springerlink.com).
  12. Lockwood JA: The Moral Standing of Insects and the Ethics of Extinction. In: The Florida Entomologist. 70. Jahrgang, Nr. 1, 1987, S. 70–89 (jstor.org).
  13. Eisemann C. H., Jorgensen W. K., Merritt D. J., Rice M. J., Cribb B. W., Webb P. D., Zalucki M. P.: Do insects feel pain? — A biological view. In: Cellular and Molecular Life Sciences. 40. Jahrgang, 1984, S. 1420–1423.
  14. Tracey, J., W. Daniel, R. I. Wilson, G. Laurent, and S. Benzer. 2003. painless, a Drosophila gene essential for nociception. Cell 113: 261-273. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0092-8674(03)00272-1
  15. a b L. Sømme: Sentience and pain in invertebrates: Report to Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety. In: Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Oslo. 2005: „no“
  16. a b Cephalopods and decapod crustaceans: their capacity to experience pain and suffering. Advocates for Animals, 2005 (org.uk [PDF]).
  17. Viñuela-Fernández I, Jones E, Welsh EM, Fleetwood-Walker SM: Pain mechanisms and their implication for the management of pain in farm and companion animals. In: Vet. J. 174. Jahrgang, Nr. 2, September 2007, S. 227–39, doi:10.1016/j.tvjl.2007.02.002, PMID 17553712 (elsevier.com).
  18. Duncan IJ, Petherick JC. "The implications of cognitive processes for animal welfare", J. Anim. Sci., volume 69, issue 12, 1991, pp. 5017–22. pmid 1808195; Curtis SE, Stricklin WR. "The importance of animal cognition in agricultural animal production systems: an overview", J. Anim. Sci.. volume 69, issue 12, 1991, pp. 5001–7. pmid 1808193
  19. Stamp Dawkins, Marian. "Scientific Basis for Assessing Suffering in Animals," in Singer, Peter. In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave. Blackwell, 2006. p. 28.
  20. Animal Welfare; Definitions for and Reporting of Pain and Distress", Animal Welfare Information Center Bulletin, Summer 2000, Vol. 11 No. 1-2, United States Department of Agriculture.
  21. Carbone 2004, p. 151.
  22. Ryder, Richard D. "Speciesism in the laboratory," in Singer, Peter. In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave. Blackwell, 2006. p. 99.
  23. Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, ILAR, National Research Council, 1996 copyright, pg 64