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The Arctic and surrounding nations

In the 19th century, the existence of the continental shelf was discovered. It was found out that the continent did not stop when the ocean started, but that part of the continent was under the ocean. And it turns out that a lot of fuel is located under the continental shelves. So, after that, the border states like Canada or Russia started to claim territories. As a result, in 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established the notion of a legal continental shelf, meaning that a state can claim a legal or theoretical continental shelf or an actual geological continental shelf within 350,000 nautical miles. States have ten years to prove scientifically what they are claiming, after the ratification of the treaty, with the possibility of revising the claim.

The United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is created to evaluate and confirm the data presented by the States. It is the only decision-making body on the separation of submarine spaces. Norway (1996), Sweden, Iceland, Russia (1997), Canada (2003) and Denmark (2004) have ratified the treaty. Thus, these bordering countries of the Arctic have ten years to claim Arctic territories, these previously international areas with 22% of the world’s undiscovered but recoverable oil and natural gas and new accessible shipping routes could also open up by the global warming, creating many conflicts. For instance, Denmark, Russia, Norway and Canada claim the North Pole.



Norway[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Norway ratified UNCLOS on 24 June 1996. Norway is a coastal country in the Arctic Ocean and has islands in the Arctic Ocean. The Norwegian continental shelf extends at least 200 nautical miles from the mainland, Svalbard and Jan Mayen. In Banana Hole, Loophole and the area north of Svalbard, the Norwegian continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles. Norway made its formal submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on 27 November 2006. [1]

The submission was accepted on 27 March 2009. It aims to extend Norway's 200-mile zone in three areas of the North-East Atlantic and in the Arctic. Following this, negotiations with neighbouring countries have started. In the Arctic, Norway has concluded delimitation agreements with Iceland, Denmark (Greenland) and Russia. Norway has also signed agreements with Iceland and Denmark (the Faroe Islands) on the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Banana Hole.

The reasons for these claims are mainly economic. Indeed, the claimed areas are full of hydrocarbons and are strategic fishing grounds. The claims are mainly located around Jan Mayen, Svalbard and the Barens Sea (border with Russia). The maritime border with Russia in the Varangerfjord area was agreed between Norway and the Soviet Union in 1957.

From 2004, the width of the territorial sea was extended and a contiguous zone extending up to 24 nautical miles was established. In 2007, Norway and Russia reached agreement on a 73 kilometre long delimitation line in the Varangerfjord area (The Norwegian Government's Arctic Policy). On 15 September 2010 in Murmansk, after long negotiations (40 years), Norway and Russia (the Norwegian and Russian Foreign Ministers) signed the Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean. The treaty entered into force in July 2011. In addition to the establishment of the delimitation line, the agreement contains provisions that ensure continued cooperation between Norway and Russia on fisheries and hydrocarbon exploitation. During the years of negotiations, Norway's position has largely been that the border should be equidistant, with no special circumstances justifying a change in its course. The USSR, on the other hand, argued that, in view of special circumstances, this delimitation line should overlap with the boundary of the Arctic sector created by Soviet decree in 1926.

Eventually, both sides agreed to abandon their position and divide the disputed area into two almost equal parts. Thus, 40 years of disputes over the overlapping claims to 20,000 km2 of continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean were brought to an end.[2] In addition to the disputes with Russia over the continental shelf, Norway also had to negotiate with Denmark and Iceland in the Norwegian Sea. In 1980, after lengthy negotiations, an agreement was reached with Iceland on the establishment of a conciliation commission on the continental shelf area between Iceland and Jan Mayen. The subsequent delimitation agreement was signed in 1981.

Negotiations with Denmark on the delimitation of the area between Jan Mayen and Greenland were conducted from 1980 until 1988, when Denmark brought the case before the International Court of Justice. The Court began the delimitation process by drawing a provisional median line dividing the disputed area down the middle, but later adjusted it. As a result, Norway received 57% of the disputed area, while Denmark received 43%.[3] The maritime delimitation agreement was signed in 1995. In 1997, the delimitation of a small maritime area between Jan Mayen, Greenland and Iceland was agreed upon, following negotiations. On 20 February 2006, an agreement was reached between Norway and Denmark, together with the Greenland Home Rule Government, on the delimitation of the continental shelf and fishing zones in the area between Greenland and Svalbard. In October 2019, Norway signed two agreements, with Iceland and Denmark/Faroe Islands respectively, on the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the southern part of Banana Hole.

Russia[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Russian Arctic claims

For Russia, the North and especially the Arctic play an important role economically, militarily and to show the unique global position and the historic roots.[4] Sovereignty in the Arctic is a top domestic and foreign policy goal, with the country having the longest Arctic coastline and the most populated Arctic region.[5]

Russia signed the UNCLOS agreement on the 10 December 1982 and ratified it on 12 March 1997.[6]

After the end of the Soviet Union, Russia did not pay much attention to the Arctic, perceiving the region as a burden due to high costs of providing its Arctic population with food, fuel and other basic needs.[7]

This changed after ice melting in the Arctic Ocean and additional globalization trends resulted in increased international interest in the Arctic, with the focus being on hydrocarbon and natural resources as well as using the area as an alternative marine transportation route connecting Asia and Europe.[7]

In 2008 Russia released the "Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic to 2020 and Beyond"[8] document, that was based on documents from the Soviet period and didn't give a narrow definition of what is Russian territory in the Arctic. It did call for legal actions to determine geographical boundaries of the Russian Arctic Zone.[9] It's four key priorities include securing the Arctic as a strategic resource base, preserving it as a zone of peace and cooperation, preserving the ecosystems and using the Northern Sea Route  as a nation-wide transport infrastructure.[10]

In 2013, the "Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Guaranteeing National Security to 2020" followed and updated the 2008 foundation. It outlines risks and threats, gives more detail to priority development directions and includes some means and mechanisms to achieve these objectives. It also focuses more on security issues.[10]

In 2014 the "Socio-economic development of the Russian Arctic Zone until 2020" program followed the 2008 call to take legal actions to determine the geographical boundaries and defined a narrower Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation. It includes  Murmansk Oblast, Nenets, Yamal-Nenets and Chukotka Autonomous Okrugs in their entirety, as well as the Taymyr municipal areas of the Krasnoyarsk Kray, several counties of the Sakha Republic and of the Arkhangelsk Oblast. The zone also includes the urban districts of Arkhangel’sk, Noril’sk, Novodvinsk, Severodvisk and Vorkuta.[9]

In 2017, it was expanded to include the Lousk, Kems and Belomorks municipal districts of Karelia. With this, over 20% of the Russian land territory are part of the Arctic Zone, over 40% of the Arctic's land are part of Russia and over 40% of the Arctic inhabitants live there.[9]

In 2020, the "Foundations of the Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic for the Period up to 2035"[11] was released, an update to the 2014 program. While not much changed about Russia’s general approach, the new document included the desire to develop the Northern Sea Route as a globally competitive national transport corridor.[12]

In 2001 Russia, after focusing especially on the Arctic in particular and not just its northern territory[7], submitted its claim regarding its continental shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2001.[13] They were the first country to do so.[14] Russia claims that seismic and bathymetric data shows that the land beneath the Arctic Ocean until the North Pole is an extension of their landmass.[15] This is supposed to show, that regardless of changing landmass due to climate change, there is a solid foundation, its continental shelf. They suggest that the Arctic, in this regard, has no difference to land.[15]

The proposed extended continental shelf concerns the Arctic and the Pacific Ocean. It claims that the Lomonosov and Alpha-Mendeleev Ridges are natural prolongations of the Russian landmass. The Lomonosov Ridge is additionally claimed by Denmark and Canada.[16] With this claim, Russia seeks to extend its shelf beyond the limit of 350nm[17] and would almost claim an area falling within the outer limits of its continental shelf that is half the size of the Arctic Ocean.[14]

As part of the Arctic five[18] they have committed themselves to continue to use the UNCLOS as a framework for the future.[19] This commitment was communicated through the Ilulissat Declaration which was released as a response to the flag planting of Russian scientists on the North Pole in 2007.[20] The goal of the expedition, that the incident was part of, was to gather further information to support the claim on the continental shelf.[21]

The CLCS deemed that the Russian submission lacked scientific evidence and requested a revision. Other reactions came from Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway and the US, with the latter denying any possibility that the Lomonosov Ridge could be a natural prolongation.[22] In 2015 Russia submitted a revised version, covering the seabed from the 200nm limit to a point somewhat beyond the North pole. Compared to the 2001 version, the claim contains 1 191 347 square kilometres in the Arctic Ocean, which is around 100 000 more than initially. On March 31, 2021, Russia handed in a second revised version, which adds another 705 000 square kilometres. This would make its extended continental shelf contain 70% of the Arctic Ocean beyond the coastal states exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Additionally, it would overlap with the Danish submission by around 800 000 square kilometres. It also overlaps with the claims made by Canada.[14]

Despite the CLCS not accepting the claims for the extended continental shelf, Russia sees the Northern Sea Route as its national transport corridor where foreign ships need authorization to pass through. It declared intentions to implement procedures for foreign ships. As a part of that, Russia recently has upgraded its Nagurskoye airbase located about 1000 kilometres south of the North Pole while also building and expanding additional facilities in the polar region to deploy surveillance and defensive assets.[23]

Denmark[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Geographically, the Kingdom of Denmark is not located in the Arctic. However, the Faroe Islands and Greenland belong to the Kingdom of Denmark. Therefore, Denmark may have claims to the Arctic, since it ratified UNCLOS on 16 November 2004. The country has then through 2014 to file a claim to an extended continental shelf.

Denmark has first submitted a first claim to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: the northern Faroe Islands, on April 29, 2009. This revendication was accepted by the Commission on March 25, 2014. Copenhagen thus stopped the clock by taking advantage of the tolerance of the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf that allows states that have made a partial submission to submit the rest of their claim later.

A map of the area Denmark is claiming and also show the Lomonosov Ridge.

Denmark stopped being focused on Greenland and the Faroe Islands and in August 2011, the Kingdom of Denmark's Arctic Strategy 2011-2020 was born[24][25]. Denmark claims that their Arctic territory could extend from Greenland to the North Pole via the underwater mountain range which traverses the pole, Lomonosov Ridge[26]. This territory is already claimed by Russia and Canada, which raised tensions in the area.

The area wanted by Denmark covers 895,000 square kilometers of seabed. Many researchers consider this claim to be very bold and unexpected[27]. Indeed, the Danish claim does not consider the pole as an unspoken claim boundary: it extends far south across the North Pole, along the Lomonossov Ridge, to the exclusive economic zone of Russia. Much of this area overlaps with areas that should be claimed by Canada and Russia.

Some scholars think that, like Canada and Russia, the objective is to appropriate potential energy resources beneath it. Some scholars believe that the explanation lies in the relationship between Denmark and Greenland[28]. Greenland wants its autonomy. The process started in June 2009. Both Denmark and Greenland have mutual interests in good relations. Denmark has many reasons to want to keep Greenland in its kingdom, including not losing its presentations on the Arctic, which would be the case with a total independence of Greenland. Breaking the legal ties between Denmark and Greenland would therefore lead to an indecent deterioration of the general standard of living in Greenland. The current block grant of DKK 3.64 billion represents more than 25% of Greenland's total public budget. Thus the discovery of exploitable resources would change the situation. Greenland therefore wishes to own Lomonosov Ridge. Denmark joins the goal in order to maintain its good relationship with Greenland. Other scholars, such as Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, assistant professor at the University of Southern Denmark, do not believe that this claim has an economic dimension at all. He says that this region "probably has no resources whatsoever". Denmark's interest would still be to shoring up its popularity in independence-seeking Greenland. But Greenland's would be about a feeling of nationhood, being part of the Arctic. And it could not claim such a territory on the international scene without Denmark's help.

Denmark has taken a step-by-step approach to developing its strategy.

First, Denmark has submitted partial claims to the Commission of South Greenland, on June 23, 2012 first, then of East Greenland, November 27, 2013 and finally of North Greenland, December 11, 2014. The claim is being examined by the Commission, which will not give its answer for another five to ten years. It may be that the Commission declares that the territories belong to more than one state. In this case, the competing nations must reach bilateral agreements over how to carve up the north pole.

 According to the rule of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, countries must justify their claim. This claim is justified by Denmark from a geological point of view: for Denmark, the North Pole would be connected to a part of the Greenlandic continental shelf, through the Lomonossov Ridge, and therefore they have the right to claim the exclusive exploitation of the seabed along the whole ridge. In other words, the Lomonossov Ridge would be an extension of Greenland.[29]

Denmark has collaborated with the other powers, the United States, Canada, Sweden and Russia Denmark to map parts of the Arctic seabed. Between 2007 and 2012, Danish scientists, along with colleagues from Canada, Sweden, and Russia, mapped a 2,000-kilometer-long (1,240-mile) undersea mountain range that runs north of Siberia. They concluded that this ridge is geologically related to Greenland. In a March 2009 interview with CBC News, Ron McNab, a retired researcher with the Geological Survey of Canada, said that early data from these mapping efforts show that Denmark, via Greenland, may be able to claim the North Pole as its own.

Canada[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Map of all Inuit regions

Not only resources interests, also Canadas’s past and currently Indigenous inhabitants on the northern Coastline result in a strong interest in the arctic regions. The Arctic and Northern Policy Framework of Canada contributes to a “In the Arctic and in the North, as in the rest of Canada, safety, security and defence are essential prerequisites for healthy communities, strong economies, and a sustainable environment” [30]

Before the ratification of the UNCLOS and in the events of the Cold War the policies of Canada in the Arctic Regions focussed on the main Lands and through that, send families in the northern Regions to populated them with Inuit People to claim their territorial areas.[31]  

The Northwest Passage

Canada ratified UNCLOS on the 7th November of 2003. Since then, it intends is to claim territory beyond the 200 nautical miles through measuring and mapping of the actual Continental shelf and on the 6th December 2013 finally submit officially the new territorial claims. [32]

In 2019 Canadas claims of the Noth West Passage, were questioned and called “ingeminated claims” by the foreign minister of the United States Mike Pompeo. Although the good relationships to its neighbour, Canada hold on to their territorial claims on the Nort West Passage. [33] 


Iceland[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Iceland ratified the UNCLOS treaty on 21 June 1985, the first country to do so. Their deadline for their new continental shelf claim was 13 May 2009, the claim was filed on 29 April 2009, and it was accepted by the Commission on 10 March 2016[34], producing a triple overlap with the Norwegian claim (validated in 2006) and the Danish claim. [35] [36]

The disputes were mainly located at the level of the island of Jan Mayen and the Norwegian Sea. The agreement of 28 May 1980 recognized that Iceland would have a full 200-mile economic zone in the area between Iceland and Jan Mayen, thus giving effect to the claims set out in the Icelandic Act of 1 June 1979 on the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf and Economic Zone of Iceland.

However, the Norwegian delegation could not accept the Icelandic view that, despite this legislation, Iceland's continental shelf would extend beyond the 200-mile zone set by Iceland. As they could not agree, a Conciliation Commission was set up to settle the dispute [37] In accordance with these provisions, the Conciliation Commission submitted an unanimous decision to both governments in May 1981. Both parties accepted these recommendations as the basis for their further negotiations. These resulted in an agreement of 22 October 1981 on the continental shelf in the area between Iceland and Jan Mayen.

All disputes related to the Icelandic shelf were settled bilaterally.

USA[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Thule Air Force Base in Thule, Greenland

The United States cannot file an application with the Commission because they has not ratified the Law of the Sea Convention. This explains the pressure from both Democrats and Republicans to ratify the Convention.[38]

Despite their absence and their inability to act due to their legal status in this area, the United States still has an interest in this area. On the one hand, from a geopolitical point of view, they insists on the application of the equidistance rule.[39]

From a scientific point of view, they are also involved in the study of the Arctic seabed. In autumn 2008, Canada and the United States joined forces in an Arctic scientific expedition using state-of-the-art technology to collect data on the outer limits of the continental shelf.


References[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Kategorie:Russia Kategorie:Canada Kategorie:Noway Kategorie:Arctic Kategorie:Claims Kategorie:Northwest Passage

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